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FAIR TREATMENT FOR CONTRACTORS DOING
BUSINESS WITH THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Scott A. Livingstont

t

Prior to 1981, there existed in Maryland a wide assortment of
procurement laws, because virtually every state agency used different procedures to award procurement contracts. The passage
of a Procurement Article, effective July 1, 1981, established a
body of uniform procurement procedures for state agencies. This
article examines past and present procurement practices in
Maryland and provides suggestions to guide future modification
of the Procurement Article. The author posits that by enacting
the Procurement Article, the Maryland General Assembly enacted into positive law the important public policy of providing
fair treatmentfor contractors who do business with the state. The
policy of fair treatment benefits Maryland taxpayers and contractors and should remain the focus of procurement law in
Maryland.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Procurement
Article,l which incorporates into Maryland law the policy of providing
fair treatment for persons who deal with the state procurement system. 2
Prior to the Article taking effect in 1981, Maryland did not have a comprehensive statute that regulated procurement of public works by state
agencies.

t B.A., Clark University, 1972; J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1975; Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, 1976-83; Partner, Dempsey, Bastianelli & Brown,
Bethesda, Maryland, Springfield, Virginia and Washington, D.C.
t This article is based on a series of columns on procurement that Mr. Livingston has
published in the Daily Record.
1. See Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981». Recently, Article 21 was transferred to
Division II of the newly created State Finance and Procurement Article. See Act of
Apr. 9, 1985, ch. 12, 1985 Md. Laws 1099 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985». During the 1986 legislative session, the General
Assembly passed the Procurement Law Revision Act, which reorganizes and modifies slightly the Procurement Article. See Procurement Law Revision Act, ch. 840,
1986 Md. Laws. The effective date of the Act is July 1, 1987. The reorganization
alters the numbering scheme of the Procurement Article. The renumbered sections
are provided herein where applicable.
2. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2661.
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The Article was enacted to provide for a comprehensive and impartial system of procurement. 3 In the opinion of the General Assembly,
persons who have a reasonable expectation of fair treatment from the
state will compete more vigorously for state contracts.4 The Procurement
Article contains provisions that were designed to implement the fair
treatment policy. Specific provisions govern the manner in which the
state awards contracts. 5 Other provisions specify mandatory terms for
inclusion in contracts6 and establish a method for resolution of disputes. 7
This article examines procurement methods used by various state
agencies prior to 1981. The article explains the laws that govern state
procurement of public works and evaluates the degree to which the Procurement Article has provided fair treatment for contractors working for
the state. Section II describes the recent history of Maryland procurement with emphasis on the period immediately preceding 1981. Section
II also discusses procurement of architectural and engineering services,
use of procurement to achieve socio-economic policy, and development
of dispute resolution procedures. Section III examines the methods used
to award contracts and resolve disputes under the Procurement Article.
In addition, section III discusses cases in which Maryland appellate
courts reviewed disputes resolved by a board of contract appeals. 8 In section IV, the author addresses the future of Maryland procurement and
presents suggestions for modifying the system in a manner that advances
the policies underlying the Procurement Article, especially the policy of
promoting fair treatment of contractors doing business with the state.
II.

PROCUREMENT PRIOR TO 1981

The history of Maryland is reflected in the history of public works,
to borrow a phrase from Victor Hugo. 9 Events of political history, fortunate and otherwise, have influenced legislation governing procurement of
public works by the state.

A.

How Contracts Were Awarded

1.

General
Prior to 1981, the methods state agencies used to award contracts
3. Id. at 2661-62.
4.Id.
5. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 13-201 to 207 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-109 to 115 (1987».
6. Id. at § 13-602 (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122 (1987».
7. Id. at §§ 17-201 to 203 (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-137
to 139 (1987».
8. The cases contained in Section III originally were decided by either the Department
of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals or its successor, the Maryland State
Board of Contract Appeals.
9. 3 VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES 127 (Thomas Nelson & Sons). Hugo observed
that "[t]he history of men is reflected in the history of sewers . . . . " Id.
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were dictated by the Board of Public Works lO and the General Assembly.1I The seminal powers of the Board of Public Works could be circumscribed by the General Assembly; 12 however, the General Assembly
did not enact a comprehensive procurement statute limiting the scope of
the Board's powers until 1981. Approval by the Board of Public Works
.usually provided sufficient authorization for a state agency to award a
contract. 13
Instead of enacting a comprehensive procurement statute, the General Assembly enacted legislation that created various executive branch
agencies. The enabling legislation for these agencies usually contained
provisions that mandated the manner in which the new agencies would
conduct procurement. 14 The methods of procurement used by state agencies varied depending upon the activities performed by the respective
agencies. For instance, the General Assembly might authorize a state
agency to obtain federal monies to finance its activities 15 and empower
the agency to contract in any manner necessary to secure federal funds. 16
Because it was authorized to comply with any federally mandated term
or condition, the agency's method of awarding contracts was not consistent necessarily with the methods utilized by other state agencies. The
pre-1981 practice of providing for procurement methods in enabling legislation produced a lack of uniformity in the procurement methods used
by state agencies.
2.

Architectural and Engineering Contracts

Contracts for procurement of architectural and engineering services
have experienced an unfortunate history in Maryland. The political activities of certain state officials revealed that on occasion architectural
and engineering contracts were awarded on the basis of subjective, rather
10. The Board of Public Works includes the Governor, the Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Treasurer. MD. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
11. See 42 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 90 (1957). For example, there was nothing in the Constitution or statutes of Maryland that required the Department of Public Improvements to invite sealed bids for construction contracts. 38 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 245,
246 (1953).
12. 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 716, 725-27 (1977).
13. See Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576 (1937); Brown v. C&O Canal Co.,
73 Md. 567, 603 (1890); see also 42 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 90 (1957) (opining that
award of contracts by the Board of Public Works was not reviewable unless tainted
by fraud, collusion, or breach of trust).
14. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 8, 1908, ch. 141, § 320, 1908 Md. Laws 252 (providing procurement methods for the State Roads Commission) (current version at MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 8-614 (1977 & Supp. 1985»; Act of Mar. 26, 1956, ch. 2,
1956 Md. Laws - Special Sess. 17 (providing procurement methods for the Maryland Port Authority) (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 62B, § 5(s) (1957» (repealed
by Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727).
15. See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5-213(b) (Supp. 1985) (State Aviation Administration).
16. [d.
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than objective, evaluation of technical proposals.1 7 In some instances, it
was alleged that architects and engineers inflated their bid prices to cover
kickbacks to corrupt politicians. 18
Prior to 1974, before awarding a contract for architectural or engineering services, state agency officials solicited expressions of interest
from qualified architects and engineers. This practice led to a form of
competitive negotiation among the architects and engineers willing to
compete under such circumstances. 19 Agency officials, some of whom
served at the pleasure of the governor, exercised broad discretion in the
selection of a project architect and engineer. 2o Fair treatment for architects and engineers who attempted to bid on public works projects was
not guaranteed adequately by Maryland law,21
In 1974, the General Assembly enacted legislation designed to open
architectural and engineering procurement to public scrutiny.22 The legislation established two new administrative boards. One board served the
Department of General Services and the other served the Department of
Transportation. Each board was responsible for providing recommendations to the Board of Public Works regarding the selection of professional
architectural and engineering services for its agency. 23
The 1974 legislation required both Professional Services Selection
Boards, which generally followed similar regulations,24 to announce publicly each request for procurement of architectural and engineering services exceeding $25,000. 25 Each announcement described the type of
services the state was seeking (e.g., landscape architecture, highway de17. R. COHEN & J. WHITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY 10,92-94, 114-16, 127-30,349
(1974) [hereinafter cited as A HEARTBEAT AWAY].
18. Id. at 114-15.
19. /d.
20. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 89B, § 40 (1957) (State Roads Commission) (repealed by
Act of Mar. 8, 1977, ch. 13, § I, 1977 Md. Laws 21); see also A HEARTBEAT
AWAY, supra note 17, at 114-16 (discussing tenure of Jerome Wolff, Chairman of
the Maryland State Roads Commission under Governor Agnew).
21. 62 Op. Md. Att'y. Gen. 716, 733 (1977).
22. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2528 (recodified as amended at MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-101 to 118 (Transp.), 19-201 to 218 (Gen.
Serv.) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-149 to 184
(Gen. Serv.) (1987».
23. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2533-34 (recodified as amended at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11O(a) (Transp.), 19-21O(a) (Gen. Serv.)
(1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-158(a) (Transp.),
11-176(a) (Gen. Serv.) (1987».
24. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 231N(a)(I) (Transp.), 231N(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.)
(Supp. 1975) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE §§ 19-105(b) (Transp.), 19205(b) (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11153(a) (Transp.), 11-171(a) (Gen. Serv.) (1987».
25. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2533 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 231P(d)(I) (Supp. 1975». The threshold dollar amount required for public
announcement of procurement requests subsequently was deleted from Maryland
law. Act of May 28,1985, ch. 744,1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. § 19-107(a) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-155(a) (1987».
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sign, etc.) and provided a procedure that interested parties could use to
obtain additional information. 26 Each agency established a committee to
interview and screen potential consultants. These consultant screening
committees, appointed for various projects, reviewed prospective architects and engineers and identified those whose expertise dovetailed with
the needs of the state. 27 The consultant screening committees evaluated
proposals received from architects and engineers and recommended qualified candidates to the appropriate Professional Services Selection
Board. 28
The Selection Board, in turn, made recommendations to the Board
of Public Works, based on criteria set forth in the 1974 legislation. 29
These criteria were the most important elements of the 1974 legislation.
The selection process required by the 1974 legislation included a competitive evaluation of technical and price proposals submitted by architects
or engineers. 30 Most significantly, the 1974 legislation provided that
neither the technical proposal nor the price proposal could be the sole
criterion supporting a recommendation on a competitive basis. 31 In theory, inclusion of this provision caused officials to balance both price and
technical proposals in making their recommendations.
The 1974 statute also contained substantial safeguards against corruption. These safeguards represented the original reason for enacting
the legislation: prevention of undue political influence in the award of
architectural and engineering contracts. When bidding for projects of
$25,000 or more, architects and engineers were required to execute a
"truth-in-negotiation" certificate stating that the costs supporting the
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(2) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-107 (Transp.), 19-208 (Gen. Serv.) (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-155 (Transp.), 11-174 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987)).
27. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 03.01.08A(2) (Gen. Serv.); tit. 11, § 01.07.11 (Transp.)
(1975) (current versions at MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 12.04.11 (Gen. Serv.),
12.02.11 (Transp.) (1985)).
28. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § .03.01.08A(2) (Gen. Serv.); tit. II, § 01.07.11 (Transp.)
(1975) (current versions at MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 12.04.11G (Gen. Serv.),
12.02.IIG(I) (Transp.) (1985)).
29. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, § I, 1974 Md. Laws 2530 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(4) (Supp. 1975)) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-110 (Transp.), 19-210 (Gen. Serv.) (1985)) (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-158 (Transp.), 11-174 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987)).
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 23IP(d)(4) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(ii) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(ii) (Gen. Serv.)
(1985)).
31. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 732, 1974 Md. Laws 2532 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 2310 (Supp. 1975)). This portion of the 1974 legislation has been amended;
the agencies are required to contract with a qualified firm for a reasonable price. See
Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, 1985 Md. Laws 3515, 3517 (codified at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(i) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.)
(1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a) (Transp.),
I I-I 75(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)).

220

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

agreed-upon compensation were accurate as of the time of contracting. 32
Along with their price quotations, architects and engineers also submitted affidavits certifying that they had not engaged in any collusive acts. 33
It generally was illegal for a prospective architect or engineer to pay anyone, other than a bona fide employee, a fee contingent on the making of a
contract for architectural or engineering services. 34 The rates charged by
architects and engineers were subject to audit. 35 Anyone who violated
these provisions was subject to prosecution for a felony.36
As a practical matter, however, the selection of architectural and
engineering consultants for state projects remained a subjective process.
Although state officials were provided with specific criteria for selection,
namely price and technical proposals, evaluation necessarily remained a
matter of broad discretionary judgment on the part of state officials. 37

B.

Terms of the Procurement Contract

1.

No Uniformity Prior to 1981

Prior to 1981, state law did not require the inclusion of uniform
terms in state contracts for procurement of public works construction
services. The contract terms differed from agency to agency. It is difficult to say whether the particular terms used reflected the diverse needs
of each agency or merely the personal preferences of various procurement officers.
The general terms of most public works contracts granted remedies
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231R(a) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-111 (Transp.), 19-211 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-159 (Transp.), 11-177 (Gen. Serv.) (1987».
33. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231S (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-112 (Transp.), 19-212 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-160 (Transp.), 11-178 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987»; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-901 (1981) (current version at MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-901 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-210 (1987».
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231V (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-114 (Transp.), 19-214 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-162 (Transp.), 11-180 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987».
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231U (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-115 (Transp.), 19-215 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-163 (Transp.), 11-181 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987».
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231W(c) (Supp. 1975) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-117 (Transp.), 19-217 (Gen. Serv.) (1985» (recodified at
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-165 (Transp.), 11-183 (Gen. Serv.)
(1987».
37. In fact, one major scandal occurred during the ten year history of the statute. In
1977, political tampering in the selection of the construction manager for the Baltimore Metro motivated the Secretary of Transportation, Harry R. Hughes, to resign
in protest from Governor Marvin Mandel's cabinet. See Livingston, Impact 0/ the
Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record, Nov. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 5; see
also 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 716, 735 n.3 (1977).
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under the contract upon the occurrence of specific events during performance of the contract. For example, one term might allow for additional compensation to the contractor if unusual subsurface conditions
increased the contractor's costs. Unfortunately, there was no uniformity
in utilization of contract terms among state agencies. A prospective contractor might find that the Mass Transit Administration incorporated
different remedy-granting terms in a contract for the construction of a
parking lot than did the State Aviation Administration. Both the Mass
Transit and State Aviation Administrations were included in the Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT);38 however, prior to 1976,
neither agency was required to provide the same relief if, for instance, a
contractor encountered unforeseen subsurface conditions.
In the early seventies, MDOT conducted a study of the various
clauses used by the modal administrations of MDOT.39 MDOT found
that numerous, often conflicting clauses were contained in boilerplate
procurement contracts. 40 In 1976, after several years of study, MDOT
adopted its "General Provisions for Construction Contracts."41
The General Provisions were important for several reasons. First,
the terms set out in the General Provisions fairly allocated the risks inherent in public works construction. Second, the General Provisions represented a major effort to coordinate the procurement practices of the
agencies in MDOT, the department that enjoyed the largest public works
budget in state government. Third, the provisions were modeled so
closely on federal clauses that case law construing the federal clauses
could be used to provide guidance under Maryland law for interpretation
of the terms contained in the General Provisions. 42 Previously, because
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, there had been a dearth of Maryland case law on contract claims against the government. 43
The sudden application of familiar federal clauses and case law encouraged national competition for state contracts, especially on the Baltimore Metro project. Only a limited number of contractors can procure
the finances, equipment, and other resources needed to build subway sta38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 207A (1971) (recodified as amended at MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 2-107(a) (Supp. 1985».
39. Brief for Appellant at 5-7, Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc.,
50 Md. App. 525, 438 A.2d 1374 (1982).
40. The Department of Transportation was created by the Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 526,
§ 1, 1970 Md. Laws 1143 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 207 (1971» (current
version at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-101 (1977».
41. The General Provisions are discussed in the June 30, 1977 internal MDOT memorandum regarding System for Resolving Contract Disputes, noted in Maryland Port
Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 536 n.8, 438 A.2d
1374, 1381 n.8 (1982).
42. Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 258
Md. 490, 500, 265 A.2d 892, 897 (1970).
43. Prior to 1976, the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded judicial resolution of
contract claims against state agencies. See American Structures, Inc. v.City of Baltimore, 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976); Maryland Port Admin. v. I.T.O. Corp.,
40 Md. App. 697, 395 A.2d 145 (1978); infra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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tions and tunnels. These contractors usually are familiar with the provisions used in standard federal contracts. Familiarity with the provisions
enables contractors to anticipate the costs of risks allocated under federal
contracts and submit their bids accordingly. Prudent contractors tend to
compete less vigorously for contracts that contain unfamiliar or unfair
clauses.
2.

Socio-Economic Policies

In Maryland, the process used to award procurement contracts for
public works incorporates procedures designed to implement socio-economic policies identified by the General Assembly.44 Public funds are
spent on projects in such a way as to encourage certain business practices
that appear to be in the public interest. For example, Maryland has enacted legislation designed to encourage the purchase of American-made
steel for state public works projects. 45 Among the several socio-economic
policies identified by the General Assembly,46 the one that most drastically affects traditional practices in public works procurement is the Minority Business Enterprise Program. 47
In order to understand how the Minority Business Enterprise
(MBE) policies affected procurement, it is necessary to examine procurement practices prior to 1978. Traditionally, the state awarded public
works contracts to the low bidder based on a formal advertisement for
sealed bids. The party identified as the low bidder became the prime contractor pursuant to a contract with the state. 48
44. The socio-economic policies identified by the General Assembly are set out in MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-101 to 807 (1985). Clauses included in state
procurement contracts are drafted in a fashion that will promote these policies.
45. Buy American Steel Act, ch. 947, 1978 Md. Laws 2758 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78A, §§ 68-72 (Supp. 1978) (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 18-701 to 705 (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. § 12-405 (1987)).
46. See, e.g., MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-101 (Small Business Set-Asides),
18-201 (Disadvantaged Business Preference), 18-301 (Resident Business Preference), 18-501 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 18-701 (Steel Procurement for Public Works) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-140 (Small Business Set-Asides), 11-141 (Disadvantaged Business Preference), 11-145 (Resident Business Preference), 12-301 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 12-401 (Steel Procurement for Public Works) (1987)).
47. Since the early 1980's, a similar federal program has been referred to as the "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program." See 49 C.F.R. § 23 (1985); see also MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-148 (1987)); Md. Admin. Reg. vol. 5, issue 8 (1978). Additional
programs are used in the procurement of public works to implement socio-economic
policies. See, e.g., MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 18-301 (Resident Business
Preference), 18-501 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 18-701 (Steel
Procurement for Public Works) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-145 (Resident Business Preference), 12-301 (Prevailing Wage in Contracts for Public Works), 12-401 (Steel Procurement for Public Works) (1987)).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 231V(a)(I)(ii) (1957 & Supp. 1977) (contracts awarded
on a competitive basis).
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When a prime contractor elected to enter into subcontracts for performance of work on a project, the state generally was not involved in the
selection of any subcontractor. The prime contractor was responsible for
completing the project according to contract specifications; accordingly,
he exercised virtually unlimited discretion in the selection of
subcontractors.
Prime contractors usually did not subcontract with businesses
owned and operated by black individuals. Instead, prime contractors
subcontracted with firms that they had dealt with for years, a practice
that civil rights advocates found operated to exclude minority firms. The
traditional practice of subcontracting with firms that the prime contractor previously had done business with tended to exclude minority businesses from participating in public works projects.
During the mid-1970's, there was an attitudinal shift among state
officials who came to recognize the importance of providing minority
persons with the opportunity to work on public works projects. In the
public sector, advocates of civil rights, equal employment opportunity,
and affirmative action began to focus their attention on reform in the area
of public works construction. 49 In 1976, the civil rights advocates and
their minority business constituents realized that the state was about to
embark on construction of the largest public works project in the history
of Maryland. 50 The Baltimore Metro project, which called for the construction of an eight mile underground transit line, was estimated by
MDOT officials at a cost of $800 million.
It was predictable that construction contracts for the Metro project
eventually would be awarded to large contractors who might not voluntarily enter into subcontracts with minority businesses. Some members of
the Maryland General Assembly conditioned their support for the project upon the receipt of assurances that minority businesses would participate in the construction process. 51 Political pressure mounted,
primarily on Secretary of Transportation Harry R. Hughes, to ensure
that minority subcontractors participated in the Baltimore Metro
project.
During its 1978 session, the General Assembly enacted legislation
designed to alter the traditional practice of subcontracting on public
works projects. 52 The legislation called for state agencies to intervene on
behalf of minority businesses in the selection of subcontractors for major
public works projects. As indicated in the preamble to the legislation, the
General Assembly was "concerned that minority businesses may ex peri49. Livingston, Impact of the Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record,
Nov. 21,1983, at 6, col. 6.
50.Id.
51. See Minutes of Board of Public Works Meetings (Mar. 3, 1977 & Apr. 22, 1977)
(statements of Sen. Robert Douglas).
52. See Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575,1978 Md. Laws 1829 (codified as amended at MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-148 (1987».

224

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

ence the effect of past discrimination" in the award of subcontracts on
state public works projects. 53 The General Assembly directed MDOT to
establish departmental procedures for procuring construction services
that encourage minority business participation to the extent of ten percent of the dollar value of contracts exceeding $100,000. 54
Anticipating the passage of minority business legislation by the General Assembly, MDOT established an MBE Program. 55 MDOT designed
the MBE Program in a fashion that implemented the policy of encouraging participation by minority businesses in MDOT construction
projects. 56
A few months after the MDOT MBE Program was established, the
General Assembly passed its minority business legislation. The legislation defined a "minority business enterprise" as a business that is "at
least 51 percent owned and controlled" by minority individuals. 57 The
53. The preamble states:
Whereas the General Assembly is concerned that minority businesses
may have experienced the effect of past discrimination in the awarding or
letting of contracts or subcontracts for the purchase of materials, supplies,
equipment and services, including construction services, for the benefit of
the State; and
Whereas, Such discrimination, although contrary to State policy, may
have been based solely on the minority status of such businesses, and not
on their competency; and
Whereas, The economic development and expansion of minority enterprises may have been impeded thereby; and
Whereas, The General Assembly deems it necessary that certain departments shall structure their contract procedures so as to facilitate and
encourage the award or letting of at least 10% of their contracts and the
subcontracts which flow therefrom to competent minority businesses; provided however, that nothing contained herein shall be construed as intending to confer or as conferring upon any minority business or any
group or individual representing a minority business, any right, privilege
or status cognizable by a court, including, but not limited to, standing to
challenge the award of any contract by or on behalf of the State, its officials, employees or agents, even where less than 10% of a department's
contracts are awarded to minority businesses, it being the intention of the
General Assembly that this Act constitute a policy direction to the Executive which is enforceable merely through the oversight function of the
General Assembly and not through the judicial branch . . . .
[d. at 1830. See also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md. App. 229,
243 n.4, 486 A.2d 224, 226 n.4 (1985) (noting that Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 193,
1983 Md. Laws 845 substituted the word "purpose" for the word "preamble").
Hence, the intent of the legislature need not be gleaned exclusively from the preamble to the Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575, 1978 Md. Laws 1829. Moreover, language
in the preamble, which purports to limit minority standing to challenge state contract awards, in fact, does not restrict standing.
54. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575,1978 Md. Laws 1829 (codified as amended at MD. ST.
FIN. & PRoe. CODE ANN. § 18-601(b)(2) (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PRoe. CODE ANN. § 11-148(b)(2) (1987)).
55. MD. DEPT. OF TRANSP., MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (Feb. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 MBE PROGRAM]'
56. [d. at 1 (statement of Hermann K. Intemann, Secretary of Transportation).
57. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 575, 1978 Md. Laws 1831 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. &
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MDOT MBE Program used a definition of "minority business enterprise" somewhat different from that contained in the legislation. The
MDOT definition emphasized the ability of an individual to influence the
management decisions of the minority business. 58
MDOT also promulgated guidelines for the interpretation of definitions contained in the MBE Program. 59 The guidelines identified criteria
that MDOT officials believed were dispositive of minority business status. MDOT used the criteria to certify bona fide minority business enterprises that were eligible to participate in public works projects. The
guidelines were used during the certification process to prevent "front"
or "sham" contractors from posing as minority businesses to obtain benefits available under the MBE Program. 60
Control by minority persons, or the lack thereof, was the principle
criterion used to determine whether a particular business was a bona fide
minority business enterprise. Control was defined as the "primary power
to influence management" of the applicant's business. 61 MDOT officials
believed that defining control in this manner would enable MDOT to
prevent sham minority businesses from participating in the MBE Program. 62 For example, a business that was fifty-one percent owned by a
minority individual would not be certified if, under a voting trust or similar agreement, the business were subject to the control of a nonminority
individual.
Following its inception in 1978, the MBE Program was refined
somewhat. Of particular importance is MDOT's decision to modify the
definition of control. No longer does the definition of control focus solely
on managerial control. 63 Since 1980, MDOT has evaluated both opera-

58.
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.

PROC. CODE ANN. § 18-601(a)(3) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-148(a)(3) (1987».
1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 7.
[d. at 8-11.
[d. at 8. See also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md. App. 239, 241,
486 A.2d 224, 225 (1985) (stating that the certification process was developed to
prevent "sham" or "front" contractors from using the MBE Program). Through a
scheme or artifice, a business corporation may appear to be controlled by a minority
individual; however, the minority individual actually is subject to undue influence
by a non minority individual. For example, suppose the minority individual is held
out as the chairman of the board of directors; suppose further that the minority
individual signs a contract-in violation of his fiduciary duty to the corporation-in
which he promises not to make any management decisions (e.g., how much to pay
for equipment rental) without the express consent of the nonminority individual.
The minority individual is directed by the nonminority individual to pay excessive
prices for rental of equipment from an equipment leasing company owned by the
nonminority individual. In this fashion, the non minority person could obtain benefits from the MDOT MBE Program.
1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 8.
[d.
Compare the definition of "control" in the 1978 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 55, at 6
("The primary power, direct or indirect, to influence the management of a business
enterprise.") with the definition of "control" in MD. DEPT. OF TRANSP., MINORITY
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM 7 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 MBE
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tional and managerial control. 64 This bifurcated evaluation allows
MDOT to analyze whether a minority individual has the requisite experience to run day-to-day business operations and enough managerial control to make "independent and unilateral business decisions." Retention
of control over bond negotiations, establishment of policy goals, and prevention of non-minority domination of company affairs are among the
powers characteristically exercised by an applicant running a bona fide
minority business enterprise. 65

C.

Resolution of Disputes

Parties to state public works contracts recognize that disputes commonly, if not invariably, arise regarding the interpretation of contract
terms. Inclusion of a "Disputes Clause," which provides a procedure for
fairly resolving contract disputes, helps prevent litigation concerning the
interpretation of contract terms from impeding completion of public
works projects. Prior to 1976, the Disputes Clause provided the principal
means that a contractor could use to obtain appropriate compensation
from the state in the event of dispute. 66 An examination of the respective
positions of the state and the contractor illustrates the manner in which
the Disputes Clause functions in the public works construction process.
1.

Disputes are Inherent

Disputes are inherent in the construction of public works projects.
A tension exists between the state and the contractor who agrees to build
a project. Each party is oriented to the contract price, which is a fixed
amount reached on the basis of competitive sealed bidding. Not only is
the contract price fixed, but it is fixed as the lowest amount offered by
any responsible contractor who competitively bid for the project.
The rationale used to justify the practice of awarding the contract to
the low bidder is that the practice promotes price competition among
those seeking public works contracts. Although it may promote competiPROGAM] ("The primary power to direct the management and operations of the
enteprise. "). The revised 1984 MBE PROGRAM contains specific examples to assist
MDOT in determining whether an applicant has the requisite levels of managerial
and operational control in a business to qualify for MBE Program benefits. Id. at
18-21. The examples pertaining to operational control focus on an applicant's experience, decision-making ability, and technical competence. Id. at 18-20. The examples pertaining to managerial control focus on documents that may affect control of
the business. The applicant's control of the business must not be restricted by language contained in corporate articles and bylaws or in partnership agreements. In
addition, the applicant must produce documents that show he is responsible for
signing pay checks and negotiating with insurance and banking institutions. Id. at
20-21. The published examples are not meant to be exclusive. Id. at 19,20.
64. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 01.10.01 (1980).
65. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 20-21.
66. Contractual relief was the contractor's primary recourse to legal remedy because,
prior to 1976, the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded court actions against
the state.
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tion, the practice of awarding to the low bidder produces an anomalous
effect. 67 As a practical matter, awarding the contract to the lowest responsible bidder forces both the contractor and the state to search intensively for means to protect, if not improve, their positions once the
contract price is fixed and performance is begun.
The parties' abilities to improve their respective positions largely depend upon the contractual language that allocates cost risks associated
with performance. The contractor, who has underbid his competitors to
win the contract, wants to minimize his performance costs. Thus, the
contractor interprets the contract language in a manner that enables him
to render the minimum performance-at the lowest cost-that complies
with the terms of the contract. The state, however, like any owner who
hires a contractor, is inclined to demand the maximum possible
performance. 68
Contract price disputes occur because the contract price is fixed low
and fixed early-at the time of bid opening. At this point, both the contractor and the state estimate generally, but neither can estimate exactly,
how much money it will cost to perform the contract. Hence, the contractor has no extra money in his bid to pay for unforeseen expenses that
occur during performance. To maintain its profit position, the contractor
is justified in requesting extra compensation when unforeseen expenses
arise.
A public works contract generally allocates the construction risks
and provides for a contractual means to deal with the risk that a dispute
will arise. 69 In the contract, the parties agree to make adjustments to the
contract price upon the occurrence of certain events that affect cost or
time of performance. For example, if the subsurface conditions at the
project site differ materially from those indicated in the plans, the con67. 34 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 217 (1949).
68. Not surprisingly, much substantive law has developed because of problems concerning the proper interpretation of contract requirements. See II R. NASH & J.
CIBINIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 978-1009 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as II NASH & CIBINIC] (describing contract interpretation rules developed on the
federal level). Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 258 Md. 490, 265 A.2d 892 (1970), a case in which the Court of Appeals
of Maryland interpreted the Changes Clause in a contract between a public corporate body and a private contractor, provides an example of this trend in Maryland.
See also Appeal of Clevecon-Au-Vianini, MDOT BCA Nos. 1007, 1013, at 17-18
(Jan. 7, 1983) (holding that contract, read as a whole, did not require tunnel walls to
be placed on firm, undisturbed rock); Appeal of Dominion Contractors, Inc.,
MSBCA No. 1040, at 10 (May 20, 1982) (applying rule that, if possible, written
contracts must be construed to give effect to all provisions contained therein in order to uphold provision requiring contractor to seek state permission to use substitute materials); Appeal of Fruin-Colnon Corp. & Horn Constr. Co., MDOT BCA
No. 1001, at 14 (Dec. 6, 1979) (interpreting contract as a whole to require placement of compressed air lines within Bolton Hill Station right of way).
69. A primary example of the provision of a contractual means to deal with the risk of
disputes during performance is the Disputes Clause set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE
tit. § 21.07.01.06 (1985).
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tract price will be adjusted to compensate for increased costs incurred as
a result. 70 A contractor who encounters subsurface conditions that differ
materially from those indicated in the plans presents to the state a claim
for an equitable adjustment. 71 The term "claim" is thus neutral insofar as
it merely signifies the contractor's exercise of a right promised by the
state.
The parties recognize in advance that there may be disputes over
whether an equitable adjustment is justified. Although each party is oriented to the contract price, both view as advantageous the provision of a
contractual procedure for resolving disputes regarding claims for equitable adjustments arising under the contract. 72
2.

Resolution via a Disputes Clause

The procedure that governs the resolution of disputes is set forth in
a Disputes Clause. 73 The current Disputes Clause authorizes the state to
decide initially the proper interpretation of contract requirements. 74
Generally, the procedure contemplates a three-tiered process. First, a
lower-level official in the agency that commissioned the project is authorized to interpret the contract terms. Second, a contractor who is dissatisfied with the interpretation can obtain upper-level administrative review
within the agency. While the interpretation is under review, the contractor remains obligated to perform the disputed work. Third, the contractor can appeal the agency's final decision to an outside forum that
reviews the agency's decision.75
Prior to 1976, the Disputes Clause in a state contract had a very
important function, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred
70. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a)(4)(ii) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(B)(1) (1987»; see also MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
21, § 07.02.04 (1985) (setting forth the Differing Site Conditions Clause required in
all state construction contracts).
71. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.01.06 (1985).
72. For a discussion of the distinction between a claim arising under a contract and a
claim for breach of contract, see James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63
Md. App. 74, 82-86,492 A.2d 308, 312-14 (1985).
73. The Disputes Clause used in MDOT construction contracts since 1976 and in state
procurement contracts since 1981 is set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21,
§ 07.01.06 (1985). The Disputes Clause used by Baltimore City is discussed in
James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 79-81,492 A.2d 308,
310-11 (1985).
74. "It is axiomatic that, within reasonable limits, parties to a contract may mutually
select their remedies for breaches or differences arising out of the performance of the
contract." James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 75, 492
A.2d 308, 308 (1985). James Julian provides support for the proposition that parties
are competent to agree that in the event of a dispute one party may determine the
meaning of the contract terms.
75. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.01.06B(7) (1985). In current form, the Disputes
Clause mandates that all appeals be delivered in writing to the Maryland State
Board of Contract Appeals.
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judicial relief in contract actions against the state. 76 The remedy-granting
clauses of the contract provided the only available contractual remedies.
The Disputes Clause governed the manner in which these remedies were
allowed. The clause defined both the timing and scope of procedures for
resolving claims arising under the substantive remedy-granting clauses.
Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented judicial review of the state agency's decision regarding the proper interpretation of
the contract terms, contractors were at the mercy of the state. Moreover,
contractors who were interested in doing business with the state were not
free to negotiate with various state agencies in order to obtain better
terms. 77 The contractor who wanted to work on public works projects
was forced to take the contract as offered by the state or leave it alone. 78
3.

Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Prior to 1976, contractors with the state tolerated the formidable
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Acts of the sovereign state were beyond
the jurisdiction of Maryland Judiciary, because the doctrine of sovereign
immunity prevented the courts from hearing any action against the state
for breach of contract. 79 With the partial waiver of sovereign immunity
in 1976, the executive branch became amenable to the jurisdiction of the
judiciary.80 The 1976 legislation, which partially rolled back sovereign
immunity in Maryland, rendered state government amenable to suit
under traditional principles of contract law. S !
The state, however, was not exposed to contract liability to quite the
same degree as were private individuals. 82 Nevertheless, the partial
waiver of sovereign immunity represented significant progress toward
76. See 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 336, 336-37 (1977) (discussing defense of sovereign immunity in Maryland prior to 1976).
77. See J. A. La Porte Corp. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 13 F. Supp. 795, 802 (D. Md.
1936).
78.Id.
79. See 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 336, 336-37 (1977).
80. Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
41, § lOA (Supp. 1976); art. 23A, § lA (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § lA (Supp. 1976); art.
25A, § lA (Supp. 1976); art. 25B, § 13A (Supp. 1976» (current versions at MD.
STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 204 (1984».
81. See Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525,
538-39,438 A.2d 1374, 1382 (1982); see also State Government & Contract Immunity Act, ch. 265, 1986 Md. Laws (providing that the defense of Sovereign Immunity may not be raised by the state, its officers or agencies in cases concerning
contracts executed on behalf of the state or its agencies). For a discussion of sovereign immunity in the context of a public works contract, see Mass Transit Admin. v.
Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).
82. The state could not be held liable for punitive damages. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ lO(A)(b) (Supp. 1977) (current version at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12202(b) (1984». In addition, instead of the usual three year statute of limitations
applicable in contract actions between private litigants, a one year statute of limitations applied to contract actions against the state. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ lO(A)(c) (Supp. 1977) (current version at MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12203 (1984».
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making state government accountable for legitimate claims. Moreover,
the partial waiver of sovereign immunity offered the promise of fair treatment to contractors doing business with the state. For the first time since
1820, the courthouse door was open to state contractors. 83
Passage of legislation that precluded the state from raising the defense of sovereign immunity in contract cases modernized the procurement system in Maryland by assuring contractors a fair hearing in court.
No longer did contractors need approval from the attorney general's office in order to recover on claims against the state. 84 Waiver of sovereign
immunity in contract cases also ended the practice of presenting claims
to the Board of Public Works in order for the top state elected officials to
determine whether to seek additional funds from the General Assembly
to cover the claims.85 Perhaps the absence of any nonpolitical means for
pursuing legitimate claims explains why, prior to 1976, "[g]enerally the
State's agencies ha[d] experienced negligible contract claims activity."86
4.

Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals

The 1976 waiver of sovereign immunity had a significant impact on
disputes concerning contracts for the construction of public works. Once
sovereign immunity was waived, it was anticipated that contractors
would bring claims against the state. Thus, state officials were forced to
consider which would be the best forum for resolution of disputes.
The waiver of sovereign immunity occurred at approximately the
same time that the design for the Baltimore Metro was completed.
Shortly thereafter, MDOT's Mass Transit Administration awarded contracts worth approximately $800 million for the construction of subway
tunnels and stations. Prospective bidders wanted assurances that the contracts would be administered fairly and that a neutral forum would be
provided for the resolution of disputes. 87
State officials considered three options during their deliberations
over how to best provide for a neutral forum to resolve disputes that
occurred during the construction of public works projects: the state court
system, private arbitration, and an executive branch board of contract
appeals. The state court systems offered certain positive features. Giving
the state courts jurisdiction over public works contract disputes would
ensure that disputes were heard in a neutral forum where both the state
and private contractors could expect impartial resolution. In addition,
court decisions would provide precedent to guide the resolution of future
83. See Act of Feb. 17, 1821, ch. 210, 1820 Md. Laws; see also Calvert Assoc. v. Department of Employment & Social Serv., 277 Md. 372, 376-79, 357 A.2d 839, 841-43
(1976) (describing the history of sovereign immunity in Maryland prior to 1976).
84. See, e.g., 23 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 435 (1938); 22 Op. Md. Att'y. Gen. 605 (1937).
85. 36 Op. Md. AU'y Gen. 145 (1951).
86. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY iii
(Nov. 1976).
87. Livingston, Impact of the Baltimore Metro on State Procurement, Daily Record,
Nov. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
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disputes. On the other hand, use of the state court system to resolve disputes was subject to disadvantages inherent in the system itself. First, the
courts were backlogged with cases. Increasing the courts' jurisdiction to
include public works contract disputes would add cases to already overcrowded dockets and increase the time needed to reach resolution. Second, judges usually would not have the technical expertise necessary to
resolve the complex issues involved in disputes over the design and construction of public works.
Providing for the resolution of disputes via arbitration, such as that
conducted by the American Arbitration Association, also had certain advantages. Arbitration, like the state courts, offered the parties a neutral
forum. Moreover, a clause calling for the arbitration of disputes easily
could be inserted in public works contracts. 88
Using arbitration to resolve disputes between the parties to public
works contracts was subject to certain disadvantages. First, arbitration
might not provide a quick resolution of the dispute. American Arbitration Association panel members have other primary occupations and, as
a result, usually devote only a few days each month to hear any particular case. Second, arbitration decisions apply only to the parties involved
in the dispute. A decision by an arbitration panel has no precedential
value. A contract clause could be interpreted differently by different
panels and a body of law would not be developed to guide contract administration on other projects.
With the huge subway project getting underway, MDOT sought the
creation of a neutral quasi-judicial body whose decisions would establish
precedents to guide the resolution of subsequent disputes. The General
Assembly, prompted by MDOT officials, opted to establish a Board of
Contract Appeals. 89 MDOT Board of Contract Appeals (MDOT BCA)
was based upon a prototype proposed in the Model Procurement Code,90
and upon various appeals boards used by the federal government. 91
88. Many private industry contracts, which utilize standard American Institute of Architect (AlA) contract forms, include arbitration clauses. In Frederick Contractors,
Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975), the court of
appeals held that the arbitration clause in an AlA contract allowed an owner who
filed for arbitration within a reasonable time to avoid foreclosure proceedings
brought by a contractor. The owner was spared the deleterious effects of foreclosure
until an arbitration award was returned. [d. at 315-16, 334 A.2d at 531.
89. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 418, 1978 Md. Laws 1548 (codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-601 to 604 (Supp. 1979» (repealed by Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775,
§ 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727). During the 1980 session, the General Assembly passed
legislation creating the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals, which assumed
the duties formerly discharged by MDOT Board of Contract Appeals. See Act of
May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 9, 1980 Md. Laws 2687 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
21, § 7-202 (1981» (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-202
(1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-138) (1987».
90. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS § 9501 (1979).
91. For a history of the development of federal boards and the Disputes Clause, see
Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29

232

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

MDOT BCA combined the best attributes of the other two options.
Like arbitration and the state court system, MDOT BCA would provide
a neutral forum. In addition, the Board was to issue published decisions
in order to establish precedent to guide resolutions of subsequent disputes. 92 The Board also was given broad jurisdiction to hear and decide
all disputes arising out of the breach of MDOT contracts. 93
MDOT BCA was not beset by disadvantages inherent in the other
two options. Members of the Board, appointed by the governor, would be
experts in public works construction. The enabling legislation required
MDOT BCA to adopt rules providing for "informal, expeditious, and
inexpensive resolution of claims and controversies."94 Moreover, there
would be no conflicts of interest, because the board members would not
serve at the pleasure of the MDOT Secretary, who was a party to the
contracts out of which disputes arose. 95
III.

POST-1981 MARYLAND PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

A.

Passage of the Procurement Article
The Procurement Article96 provides an equitable, modern system
for the procurement of public works projects. Three important features
distinguish the modern system from the procurement practices used by
the state prior to 1981. First, the Procurement Article establishes uniform methods for the awarding of all state contracts. 97 The preferred
method for awarding contracts for construction of public works is competitive sealed bidding. 98 By using the method of competitive sealed bidding, the state is obligated to award contracts for construction of public
works to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. 99 Second, the

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

98.

99.

LA W & CONTEMP. PROB. 39, 42-57 (1964). See also Maryland Port Admin. v. John
W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44,46-49, 492 A.2d 281, 282 (1985).
Published decisions may be obtained from the Maryland State Board of Contract
Appeals. Beginning in the summer of 1986, decisions rendered by the Maryland
State Board of Contract Appeals will be published formally by the Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education for Lawyers (MICPEL).
See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-603 (Supp. 1979) (repealed).
See MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-604 (Supp. 1979) (repealed).
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 2-601, 602 (Supp. 1979) (repealed).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981) (current versions at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 184) (1987».
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-201 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109) (1987». Under the pre-1981 system, there were no
comprehensive uniform procedures for the awarding of state contracts. See supra
notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 13-201(b), 13-202 (1985) (recodified at MD.
ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-109(b), 11-110 (1987». For a discussion of
competitive sealed bidding and mistakes in bidding, see Maryland Port Admin. v.
John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985).
MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-202(g) (1985); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21,
§ 05.01.02 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § ll-11O(b)(5)
(1987».
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Procurement Article establishes specific clauses that must be included in
all state construction contracts. lOG The clauses are contained in regulations that have been promulgated to implement the provisions of the Procurement Article. 101 These mandatory clauses are designed to allocate
fairly the risks inherent in the construction of public works projects. 102
Third, the Procurement Article establishes the Maryland State Board of
Contract Appeals (MSBCA).
The General Assembly recognized that MDOT BCA had operated
successfully since 1978 as a forum for resolution of disputes. MDOT
BCA functioned from July 1, 1978, until July 1, 1981, when MSBCA
succeeded it. 103 The Procurement Article endows MSBCA with even
broader powers than those enjoyed by MDOT BCA, and makes MSBCA
a permanent part of Maryland's system for procurement of public works.
All of the appeals pending before MDOT BCA on July 1, 1981, were
transferred automatically to MSBCA.I04 The transfer of appeals from
one board to the other did not impact on the parties' rights because the
rules and regulations of MSBCA were similar to those of MDOT
BCA.105
There are two particularly important differences between MDOT
BCA and MSBCA. The major difference between the old MDOT BCA
and new MSBCA is that MSBCA has much broader jurisdiction than did
MDOT BCA. Instead of merely having jurisdiction over disputes regarding contracts entered into by the Department of Transportation, as did
MDOT BCA, MSBCA has jurisdiction over disputes relating to any contract entered into by the state. 106 In addition, MSBCA has jurisdiction to
hear and decide bid protests, which are disputes relating to the formation
of state contracts. 107 Prior to the establishment of MSBCA, bid protests
were resolved summarily by the Board of Public Works. The practice of
summary resolution of bid protests by the Board of Public Works was
altered by the General Assembly because it left the state vulnerable to
public criticism of political favoritism. !Os
100. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(A) (1987)).
101. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 07.01.01 to 07.02.10 (1985).
102. Livingston, The Proposed New DSC Clause-A Mistake, Daily Record, Jan. 15,
1985, at 3, col. 3.
103. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 26, 1980 Md. Laws 2745.
104. [d. at § 22.
105. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, §§ 10.07.01 to 10.07.08 (1981).
106. Compare MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 2-603(b) (Supp. 1979) (repealed by Act of
May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 21, 1980 Md. Laws 2727) (jurisdiction limited to disputes
arising under contract with MDOT) with MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 17201 (d), 17-202(c)(1) (1985) (jurisdiction over disputes relating to contract with
state) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-137(D)(I), 11138(c)(1) (1987)).
107. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(e)(I) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-137(F)(1) (1987)).
108. Livingston, State Bid Projects Face Shift in Jurisdiction, Daily Record, Dec. 21,
1983, at 3, col. 1.
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The second difference between MDOT BCA and MSBCA concerns
the right of a state agency to obtain judicial review of a decision by a
board of contract appeals. A decision by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland established that an agency was an "aggrieved party" who
could appeal a decision of MDOT BCA. \09 The Procurement Article
spells out the right of either party to seek judicial review of a decision
rendered by MSBCA.I \0

B.

Decisions By The Boards

0/ Contract Appeals

In the process of hearing disputes between private contractors and
the state, both MSBCA and MDOT BCA have generated a substantial
body of case law on disputes relating to contracts with the state. I II The
body of case law on bid protests and performance disputes provides precedent to guide the resolution of disputes.
Only three decisions on construction disputes rendered by either
MDOT BCA or MSBCA have been reviewed by Maryland appellate
courts. The three decisions involve claims brought against state agencies
by contractors. One decision, Maryland Port Administration v. C J.
Langen/elder & Son, Inc., 112 clearly establishes that the board of contract
appeals is empowered to give complete relief to contractors doing business with the state. The other two decisions, Mass Transit Administration
v. Granite Construction Co. 113 and Maryland Port Administration v. John
W. Brawner Contracting Co., 114 involve the application of traditional
concepts of contract law to resolve disputes between a contractor and a
state agency.
1.

Power to Resolve Disputes

C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., contracted with the Maryland Port
Administration (MPA) to dredge portions of Baltimore Harbor. Three
claims arose during contract performance. All three claims were denied
by the MP A procurement officer and a timely appeal was taken to
MDOT BCA.
109. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 438
A.2d 1374 (1982). MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215 (1984) provides aggrieved parties with the right to appeal.
110. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, § 9, 1980 Md. Laws 2690 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 21, § 7-203(b) (1981) (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. § 17-203(b) (1985)) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11139(b) (1987)).
111. For an excellent summary of the case law on bid protests developed by MSBCA, see
the article presented by Allan S. Levy, Associate Member of the Board, to a
MICPEL seminar dated Sept. 22, 1984. See also Kennedy Temporaries v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 57 Md. App. 22, 39-41, 468 A.2d 1026, 1034-35 (1984)
(discussing bid protest requirements).
112. 50 Md. App. 525, 438 A.2d 1374 (1982).
113. 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).
114. 330 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985).
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The first claim, Appeal of C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 115 required
MDOT BCA to interpret the provisions of a contract for a maintenance
dredging project. The contract did not indicate that Langenfelder would
have to remove original river bottom material from elevations above project grade. I 16 Because substantial portions of original river bottom were
encountered above project grade, Langenfelder sought an equitable adjustment under the Differing Site Condition Clause in its contract with
the state. 117
MDOT BCA interpreted the term "maintenance dredging" to mean
the parties had intended that only materials resulting from natural siltation would be dredged from above grade. I IS MDOT BCA ruled that the
presence of original river bottom above project grade constituted a latent
physical condition at the site that was compensable under the Differing
Site Condition Clause. 119 MDOT BCA overruled the MP A procurement
officer's decision and granted Langenfelder's claim for an equitable
adjustment.
During its determination of the second claim, which involved a request for an equitable adjustment for increased costs engendered by an
MP A change order, MDOT BCA recognized that the contractor's bid
was based on the unit price of material to be removed. During contract
performance, MPA changed the contract by deleting the least costly area
to be dredged, which made the unchanged work more expensive, on the
average, than contemplated in the contractor's estimate. 120 MDOT BCA
ruled that the deletion of the·least costly area constituted a "constructive
115. Appeal of C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 35-52 (Aug.
15, 1980).
116. [d. at 44-46.
117. The Differing Site Conditions Clause included in the Langen/elder contract, G.P.4.04(A), is similar to the clause set forth in MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.04
(1985), which provides for equitable adjustment in the following manner:
(1) The Contractor shall promptly, and before such conditions are
disturbed, notify the procurement officer in writing of: (1) subsurface or
latent physical conditions at the site differing materially from those indicated in this contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site of an
unusual nature, differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and
generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in
this contract. The procurement officer shall promptly investigate the conditions, and if he finds that such conditions do materially differ and cause
an increase or decrease in the Contractor's cost of, or the time required
for, performance of any part of the work under this contract, whether or
not changed as a result of such conditions, an equitable adjustment shall
be made and the contract modified in writing accordingly.
[d.
118. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 44-50.
119. [d. at 50.
120. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 17 (Aug. 15, 1980). The contract at issue in Langen/elder
contained a Construction Changes Clause. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.01
(1985) sets out a Changes Clause that is required to be included in all state construction contracts. The Changes Clause provides for constructive changes as follows:
(1) The procurement officer may, at any time, without notice to the
sureties, if any, by written order designated or indicated to be a change
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change" requmng an equitable adjustment of the contract price. 121
MP A's alteration of the contract requirements modified the performance
required under the contract. Accordingly, MDOT BCA equitably adjusted the unit price of dredging to reflect the increase in unit cost of
performance caused by MPA's deletion of the least costly dredging.122
The third claim concerned an allegation by the contractor that the
presence of debris in the area to be dredged constituted a differing site
condition. 123 MDOT BCA found that the presence of debris did not constitute a differing site condition and rejected this claim on the ground
that an adequate pre-bid site investigation would have alerted the contractor to the presence of most of the debris.124 MDOT BCA, however,
granted an equitable adjustment to the contractor under the Changes
Clause as compensation for cost increases resulting from the removal of
order, make any change in the work within the general scope of the contract, including but not limited to changes:
(a) In the specifications (including drawings and designs);
(b) In the method or manner of performance of the work;
(c) In the State-furnished facilities, equipment, materials, services, or
site; or
(d) Directing acceleration in the performance of the work.
(2) Any other written order or an oral order (which terms as used in
this paragraph (2) shall include direction, instruction, interpretation or determination) from the procurement officer which causes any such change,
shall be treated as a change order under this clause, provided that the
Contractor gives the procurement officer written notice stating the date,
circumstances, and source of the order and that the Contractor regards the
order as a change order.
Id.
121. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 18. For a discussion of the concept of constructive
change, see II NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 68, at 1206-59.
122. MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 18-25.
123. MDOT BCA No. 1006, at 55 (Aug. 15, 1980).
124. Id. at 58. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 07.02.05 (1985) requires the following Site
Investigation Clause in all construction contracts:
The Contractor acknowledges that he has investigated and satisfied
himself as to the conditions affecting the work, including but not restricted
to those bearing upon transportation, disposal, handling and storage of
materials, availability of labor, water, electric power, roads and uncertainties of weather, river stages, tides or similar physical conditions at the site,
the conformation and conditions of the ground, the character of equipment and facilities needed preliminary to and during prosecution of the
work. The Contractor further acknowledges that he has satisfied himself
as to the character, quality and quantity of surface and subsurface materials or obstacles to be encountered insofar as this information is reasonably
ascertainable from an inspection of the site, including all exploratory work
done by the State, as well as from information presented by the drawings
and specifications made a party of this contract. Any failure by the Contractor to acquaint himself with the available information may not relieve
him from responsibility for estimating properly the difficulty or cost of
successfully performing the work. The State assumes no responsibility for
any conclusions or interpretations made by the Contractor on the basis of
the information made available by the State.
Id.

1986]

State Procurement

237

certain types of debris. 125
In addition to providing equitable adjustments to the contractor on
all three claims, MDOT BCA allowed predecision interest on the adjustments. The predecision interest was granted as compensation for the loss
of use of funds during the period from the date the contractor incurred
the extra cost to the date of the MDOT BCA decision. 126 MDOT BCA
also allowed postdecision interest on the three claims. The award of
postdecision interest ran from the date on which the MDOT BCA decision was issued through the date on which MP A paid the contractor in
accordance with the decision. 127
Dissatisfied with the decision rendered by MDOT BCA, MP A
sought judicial review in the Baltimore City Court. MP A challenged
MDOT BCA's award of predecision and postdecision interest to the contractor on all three claims. Although the Baltimore City Court held that
MP A had a right to judicial review of MDOT BCA's decision under the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act,128 it upheld MDOT BCA's decision awarding interest. 129
Both parties appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
The court of special appeals reviewed the decisions rendered by MDOT
BCA and the Baltimore City Court. In its review of Langenfelder's argument that MP A lacked standing to challenge the MDOT BCA decision,
the court engaged in a detailed examination of the relationship between
MP A and MDOT BCA. 130 The court observed that MDOT BCA's powers "lay somewhere between that of an arbitration panel and that of a
court."J31 MPA, on the other hand, was not a quasi-judicial agency attempting to uphold its decisions. 132 The court determined that MP A had
125. MDOT BCA No. 1006, at 59.
126. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 52; MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 32-34; MDOT BCA No.
1006, at 61.
127. MDOT BCA No. 1000, at 52; MDOT BCA No. 1003, at 35; MDOT BCA No.
1006, at 61.
128. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 24-P/317/0-105150, at 1
(Baltimore City Court, Mar. 24, 1981) (incorporating by reference memorandum
opinion of Cardin, J., Dec. 5, 1980); see also MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10215 (1984) (providing aggrieved parties with the right to appeal).
129. Id. at 4. The Baltimore City Court, per Judge Greenfeld, observed that the contract
between MP A and Langenfelder did not contain a provision that prohibited the
award of predecision interest as part of an equitable adjustment. Shortly thereafter,
MDOT introduced a provision that prohibited predecision interest as part of an
equitable adjustment. See STATE HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS § 10.01, at 77 (Jan. 1982). The award
of predecision interest by the court of special appeals in Langen/elder created a
question as to the enforceability of the provision. This question was resolved by the
General Assembly in its 1986 session. The General Assembly passed legislation that
rendered the provision unenforceable. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract
Claims Act, ch. 863, 1986 Md. Laws.
130. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 528-31,
545,438 A.2d 1374, 1375-77, 1385 (1982).
131. Id. at 545, 438 A.2d at 1385.
132. Id. at 533-34, 438 A.2d at 1379.
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standing to appeal the adverse MDOT BCA decision, because it was an
"aggrieved party within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act." 133
In its opinion, the court examined the authority of MDOT BCA to
allow contractors compensation for the cost of financing work not contemplated in the contract. MDOT BCA allowed this compensation,
which is often referred to as "interest," as part of the equitable adjustment. 134 The court explained that an equitable adjustment can be viewed
as the exchange of mutual consideration between contractors and the
state:
[An equitable adjustment] is part of-and is to some extent the
quid pro quo-for an arrangement whereby the contractor

agrees not to stop work when a dispute arises, but to proceed in
accordance with the government's directives, reserving for administrative resolution the question of how much, if anything,
it is entitled to as a result of the changed conditions. 135
In instances where the state modifies a contract, an equitable adjustment
is granted to compensate the contractor fully for its increased performance costs. 136
The court viewed predecision interest as compensation for the cost
of financing additional work engendered by the contract modification. t37
Although the court recognized that Maryland law did not mandate the
award of predecision interest, the court accepted the notion, applicable to
federal contracting practices, that the contractor is not compensated
fully unless he receives compensation for his financing costs:
there can be no equitable adjustment until the contractor recovers the entire cost of doing the extra work, and the cost of
money to finance the additional work is a legitimate cost of the
work itself. This is true whether the cost of the money is in the
form of interest paid on borrowed funds or the loss of income
on the contractor's own capital invested in the additional
work. 13S
133. Id. at 537,438 A.2d at 1380-81. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 1O-215(a) (1984)
provides that "[a] party who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is
entitled to judicial review . . . . "
134. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 538-46,
438 A.2d 1374, 1382-86 (1982).
135. /d. at 540, 438 A.2d at 1382. For a discussion of comparable disputes clauses in
Baltimore City public works contracts, see James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 78-79, 492 A.2d 308, 310 (1985).
136. See Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 516, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
137. Maryland Port Admin. v. C. J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 50 Md. App. 525, 539-45,
438 A.2d 1374, 1383 (1982).
138. Id. at 543, 438 A.2d at 1384 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS & SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., CONTRACTS DISPUTES ACT OF 1978, S. REP.
No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5235, 5266).
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Moreover, determination of the amount of predecision interest is based
upon, as nearly as possible, actual cost to the contractor, rather than a
standard borrowing rate, such as the prime rate, which may not reflect
the contractor's cost. The court of special appeals endorsed MDOT
BCA's ruling that predecision interest begins to accrue on the earliest
date that the state reasonably should have known the dollar amount of
the contractor's claims. 139
The court also found that MDOT BCA was empowered to award
postdecision interest to Langenfelder. l40 The court, however, held that
the award of postdecision interest at the ten percent rate used by MDOT
BCA exceeded the permissible legal rate. 141 Therefore, the case was remanded to the Baltimore City Court for modification of the rate of
postdecision interest. 142
2.

Unjust Enrichment

In Mass Transit Administration v. Granite Construction Co., 143 the
contractor was involved in a dispute with the state concerning work it
had performed on the Baltimore Metro project. During the preparation
of its bid on a contract to build a subway station for the Baltimore Metro
project, Granite obtained an oral interpretation of certain plans from an
official of the contracting agency, the Mass Transit Administration
(MTA). Although the MTA official explained that he was not the proper
person to interpret the plans, Granite solicited his opinion on whether
Granite or a third party utility company would have to relocate gas lines.
Eventually, the MTA official opined that the plans obligated the utility
company, not the bidder, to relocate the gas lines. In reliance on the
MTA official's statement, Granite omitted from its bid the cost of relocating the gas lines.
Prior to the award of the contract, Granite, the low bidder, was
informed that it would have to relocate the gas lines. After all of the gas
lines had been relocated, Granite's field representatives learned of the
pre-bid oral opinion given by the MTA official. l44 Granite then filed a
139. [d. at 545, 438 A.2d at 1385. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract Claims
Act, ch. 863, 1986 Md. Laws (providing that interest may not accrue from a date
before receipt of the claim by the procurement officer for a specific agency); Procurement Law-Interest on Contract Appeal Decisions Act, ch. 852, 1986 Md. Laws
(providing that interest accrues at a rate of 10 percent per annum).
140. [d. at 545-46, 438 A.2d at 1385-86.
141. [d. at 546, 438 A.2d at 1386. The court of special appeals held that the "legal" rate
of interest for MOOT BCA awards was six percent. [d. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-107(a) (Supp. 1985), which permits interest on judgments at the
rate of 10% per annum, only applies to judgments rendered by a court. [d.
142. Effective July 1,1986 the rates ofpredecision and postdecision interest will be governed by statute. See Procurement Law-Interest on Contract Appeal Decisions Act,
ch. 852, 1986 Md. Laws (codified at MD. ST. FIN & PROC. CoDE ANN. § 17-203
(1986».
143. 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).
144. [d. at 771-72, 471 A.2d at 1123-24.
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claim seeking additional compensation for what it alleged was additional
work.
Following the denial of its claim by MTA, Granite appealed the
agency's decision to MSBCA. MSBCA also denied Granite's claim. Following MSBCA denial, Granite filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that MTA had been enriched unjustly in an amount equal to
Granite's cost to relocate the gas lines. MSBCA denied Granite's claim,
holding that the doctrine of unjust enrichment was not applicable. Thereafter, Granite appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which
reversed the MSBCAI45 and ordered MTA to pay Granite additional
compensation.
MTA appealed the decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Granite again argued that
the doctrine of unjust enrichment applied and contended that it should
be allowed to recover under a theory of quasi-contract. Granite argued
that the opinion of the MTA official had misled it regarding the extent of
its responsibilities under the contract. Therefore, Granite argued, MTA
was enriched unjustly in the amount of the value of relocation of the gas
lines, which had not been included in its bid. l46
The court rejected Granite's claim for additional compensation,
finding that MTA was not enriched unjustly. 147 Granite failed to demonstrate that the enrichment was so unjust as to move the court to award
compensation. The court cited two reasons for finding that Granite's reliance on the MTA official's pre-bid oral statement was unreasonable.
First, the MTA official explained to Granite that he could not provide an
authoritative opinion regarding relocation of the gas lines. 148 Second,
although the contract permitted prospective bidders to solicit explanations of project specifications, it also provided that MTA was not bound
by oral explanations. 149
The court concluded that, even ifMTA had been enriched unjustly,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented recovery.150 The State of
Maryland had waived the defense of sovereign immunity in contract
cases only as to claims that involve written contracts. Because Granite's
claim for unjust enrichment was premised upon the existence of a contract implied in law, the claim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 151
145. Granite Constr. Co. v. Mass Transit Admin., No. 82197713, at 3 (Circuit Court of
Maryland for Baltimore City, Iuly 29, 1981).
146. Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 776-78,471 A.2d
1121, 1127 (1984).
147. [d. at 780, 471 A.2d at 1128.
148. [d. at 777, 471 A.2d at 1126-27.
149. [d.
150. [d. at 780-81, 471 A.2d at 1128.
151. [d. at 780, 471 A.2d at 1128.
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Reformation of Contract

Maryland Port Administration v. John W. Brawner Contracting
Co. 152 included two factually similar cases that were consolidated for appeal. Two contractors submitted bids to the state containing arithmetic
errors. Both contractors were low bidders on their respective contracts
and were awarded the contracts. Following award, the contractors discovered the errors in their bids and asked the state agencies that commissioned the projects to correct the contract prices to compensate for the
bid errors. Both contractors decided to proceed with their contracts;
however, the agencies refused to alter the contract prices.
In separate appeals to MSBCA, each contractor argued that, under
the reformation of contract doctrine, the agencies wrongfully refused to
correct contract price. The agencies argued that both cases should be
resolved by applying a state regulation that addressed the correction of
bid mistakes discovered after contract award. 153 The regulation provided
that "changes in price are not permitted" following award. 154 MSBCA
construed this regulation to mean that the agencies could permit correction where it would be "unconscionable not to do SO."155 Both cases were
remanded to the respective agency heads for a determination as to
whether it would be unconscionable not to provide the requested price
modifications.
The state appealed both cases to the Circuit Court of Maryland for
Baltimore City, which upheld the MSBCA decisions. 156 On review, the
court of appeals reversed the MSBCA and the circuit court. The court of
appeals held that the reformation of contract doctrine was not applicable.
In order for a court of equity to reform a written contract, there must be
either mutual mistake by the parties or the making of the contract must
be tainted by fraud, duress, or inequitable conduct. 157 Both cases involved unilateral mistakes by the contractors, and neither case involved
allegations of fraud, duress, or inequitable conduct. Therefore, the contracts would not be reformed in order to compensate for allegedly mistaken low bid prices. 158
152. 303 Md. 44, 492 A.2d 281 (1985).
153. Appeal of John W. Brawner Contracting Co., MSBCA No. 1085, at 6 (July 25,
1983); Appeal of J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., MSBCA No. 1078, at 3 (July 25,
1983).
154. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 21, § 05.02.12D (1983).
155. Appeal of John W. Brawner Contracting Co., MSBCA No. 1085, at 10 (July 25,
1983); Appeal of J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., MSBCA No. 1078, at 4 (July 25,
1983).
156. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., No. 83236025, at 3
(Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City, July 13, 1984); Maryland State
Board of Contract Appeals v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., No. 83235003, at 3
(Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City, July 13, 1984). Compare Mayor of
Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956).
157. Maryland Port Admin. v. John W. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 59,492
A.2d 281, 288 (1985).
158. [d.
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More significantly, the court of appeals held that, under the regulation, the agencies lacked discretion to correct the bid price after contract
award. In the opinion of the court, the regulation was promulgated to
prevent chicanery and to inspire public confidence in the bidding process. 159 In the court's view, holding in favor of the contractors would
ignore the regulatory provision that "[c]hanges in price are not
permitted." 160

C.

1985 Architectural and Engineering Procurement Legis/ation

During the 1985 legislative session, the General Assembly enacted
legislation to change the 1974 laws governing the procurement of architectural and engineering services. 161 The 1985 law is modeled on federal
legislation that established a federal policy of negotiating architectural
and engineering contracts on the basis of demonstrated qualification for
the type of professional services required at a reasonable price. 162
The 1974 legislation, which radically revised the practices used to
procure architectural and engineering services, had received a substantial
amount of criticism. 163 Critics of the 1974 legislation argued that it took
too long to select the architects and engineers. Emphasis on the price
criterion led to lower quality design because state officials were reluctant
to opt for higher priced services associated with better technical proposals. Emphasis on the price criterion, in turn, resulted in lower quality
design engineering. Occasionally, additional disputes arose during the
construction phase of the project, because cheaper, lower quality design
proposals led to defective plans.
The 1985 law abolished a crucial provision of the 1974 law which
provided that neither price nor technical proposal would be the sole criterion for selection. l64 Although this provision ostensibly provided for
selection based on both price and technical proposal, in reality, under the
1974 law selection was based primarily on price. 165
159. [d. at 59-60,492 A.2d at 287. See MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-201(b)
(1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-102(b) (1987».
160. 330 Md. 44, 60, 492 A.2d 281, 289.
161. Act of May 28,1985, ch. 744, § I, 1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-107, 19-109, 19-109.1, 19-111, 19-209, 19-211 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-155, 11-157, 11-157.1, 11-159,
11-175, 11-177 (1987».
162. 40 U.S.C. 542 (1982).
163. See 1985 HEARINGS ON THE AWARD OF ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING
CONTRACTS, supra note 76 (MDOT written testimony, at 1-2).
164. See Act of May 31,1974, ch. 732, § 1,1974 Md. Laws 2532 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 231-0 (Supp. 1975» (current version at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 19-109(a)(2) (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ I I-I 57(a)(2), (1987». The provision of the 1974 law providing that neither
price nor technical proposal would be the sole selection criterion was abolished by
the Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, § I, 1985 Md. Laws 3514 (codified at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 19-109 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11-157 (1987».
165. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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The 1985 law calls for the Departments of General Services and
Transportation to negotiate an architectural and engineering contract
with the most qualified firm at a rate of compensation each agency determines is fair, competitive, and reasonable. 166 The 1985 law encourages
architects and engineers not to compromise the quality of design services
and to present solutions that may cost more to design but save money
during the construction phase. 167 Design proposals submitted for a particular project are evaluated to determine whether technically superior
proposals justify higher prices. No longer must consultants submit their
cheapest proposals or risk elimination from the competition by a less expensive proposal.
If the agencies are unable to negotiate a satisfactory contract at a
reasonable price with the firm that is considered most qualified, they terminate the negotiations l68 and initiate negotiations with the second most
qualified firm.169 The agencies are required to follow the same procedure in their negotiations with the second most qualified firm and attempt to negotiate a contract at a fair price. 170 This process continues
until the agencies have contracted with a qualified firm at a fair price.
This method of awarding contracts is designed to protect Maryland taxpayers because architects and engineers know that the agencies will terminate negotiations if unreasonable fees are demanded.l7l
Under the 1985 law, the Transportation and General Services Selection Boards have assumed more of a supervisory role than they had
under the 1974 law. For example, both boards can delegate negotiations
to subordinate committees, which are akin to the old consultant screening committees. l72 The boards, however, must review all contract documents at public meetings. 173 In an effort to continue to prevent the
166. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 744, § 1, 1985 Md. Laws 3515-18 (codified at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.)
(1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2) (Transp.),
11-175(a)(2) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)).
167. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS -SELECTION OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, S. REP. No. 1219, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4767, 4769.
168. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(ii) (Transp.), 19-209(a)(2)(iii) (Gen.
Serv.) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(ii)
(Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(ii) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PUBLIC BUILDINGS -SELECTION OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, S. REP. No. 1219, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4767, 4770 (assessing procurement of architectural and engineering services for federal projects).
172. MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(iv) (Transp. Selection Board),
19-209(a)(2)(v) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. 11-157(a)(2)(iv) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(v) (Gen. Serv.) (1987)).
173. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(v)(l) (Transp. Selection Board),
19-209(a)(2)(vi)(I) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(v) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(vi) (Gen. Serv.)
(1987)).
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reemergence of pre-1974 abuses, the legislature requires that both boards
make public all documents relating to a'fard, including proposals, internal work sheets, and all other information relevant to the negotiation of
architectural and engineering contracts. 174
In contrast to appeals over formation of other state construction
contracts, bid protests regarding architectural and engineering contracts
are decided by the Board of Public Works.175 This anomaly may have
occurred because the 1974 legislation, which followed the 1973 resignation of Vice-President Agnew, was still rather new in 1981 when the
MSBCA was established to hear bid protests. In addition, the Board of
Public Works hears only a few bid protests over the award of consulting
contracts. Hence, the General Assembly may have viewed as unnecessary
the transfer to MSBCA of bid protests regarding architectural and engineering contracts.
Passage of the 1985 law by the General Assembly preserved the integrity of architectural and engineering procurement and dispensed with
the excessive concern over securing architectural and engineering contracts at the lowest possible price. The 1985 law achieves a fair balance
between the state's interest in allowing true competition for architectural
and engineering contracts and the taxpayers' preference for reasonable
expenditures by the state. The 1985 law should provide the state with
efficient, high-quality architectural and engineering services, in a manner
that is consistent with the public's demand for an honest, cost-effective
system of procurement in Maryland. Thus, the 1985 law promotes the
major purposes and policies underlying the Procurement Article.l7 6

D.

Minority Business Enterprise Program

Since 1981, an increasing number of administrative decisions have
addressed the factual circumstances that are sufficient to permit an applicant to acquire MBE status. 177 As it has become more institutionalized,
the MBE Program has established itself as somewhat of a fixture in
Maryland procurement. The MBE Program has become a fixture despite
the original purpose of the legislation, which was enacted as a temporary
measure to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination.
174. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 19-109(a)(2)(v)(2) (Transp. Selection Board),
19-209(a)(2)(vi)(2) (Gen. Servo Selection Board) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-157(a)(2)(v)(2) (Transp.), 11-175(a)(2)(vi)(2) (Gen.
Serv.) (1987)).
175. Compare MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(c)(I) (1985) (resolution of
disputes relating to state construction contracts) with MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. § 17-201(g) (1985) (resolution of disputes relating to state contracts for architectural or engineering services) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN.
§§ 11-137(B)(I), 11-137(a) (1987)).
176. See MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-201(b) (1985) (listing the purposes and
policies of the Procurement Article) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE
ANN. § 11-102(b) (1987)).
177. In contracts for federally funded projects, the term "Disadvantaged Business Enterprise" is the functional equivalent of the term MBE.
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In order to become certified as an MBE, a party must file a formal
application with MDOT.178 Following receipt of the application, MDOT
investigates, holds hearings, and issues a formal order of certification or
denial. 179 Decisions rendered by MDOT are subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act. ISO
The certification process can be scholarly. The process focuses on
details of an applicant's legal, financial, and business acumen and experience. ISI MDOT strives to ensure that the process remains fair, consistent
with the rationale underlying the Procurement Article and the shortterm goal of ending discrimination against MBE participation on state
contracts.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF PROCUREMENT IN MARYLAND

In 1981, with the enactment of the Procurement Article,IS2 the General Assembly established a modem system of procurement in Maryland.
The pre-1981 regime was characterized by laws that occasionally failed
to separate the personal agendas of state politicians from procurement
goals. The Procurement Article reduced the potential for abuse that prevailed under the pre-1981 procurement system-especially that which
prevailed under the pre-1976 system, when the doctrine of sovereign immunity largely prevented the courts from safeguarding contractors'
rights.
The major elements of the modem procurement system should not
be subject to drastic change in the foreseeable future. The General Assembly should not revive the doctrine of sovereign immunity, nor should
it amend the Procurement Article to require that state contracts include
oppressive clauses that unfairly allocate risks to private contractors. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, MSBCA must not be disestablished unless a neutral forum for resolving disputes between contractors
and the state is created to function in its place.
In the future, it is likely that as the General Assembly modifies its
conception of fair procurement policy, slight adjustments may be made
to the administrative practices used to implement provisions in the Procurement Article. The use of mandatory contract clauses, which make
sense for large public works projects, may be withdrawn from contracts
178. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 46-48; see also Certification of the Eligibility
of Minority Business Enterprises, 49 C.F.R. § 23.51 (1985) (discussing federal certification requirements).
179. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 50-58.
180. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 10-215 (1984); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11,
§ 01.14.12(A) (1984); see also Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 61 Md.
App. 239, 248, 486 A.2d 224, 228 (1985) (holding that withdrawal of certification is
reviewable).
181. 1984 MBE PROGRAM, supra note 63, at 18-23.
182. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (codified as amended at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 19-218 (1985» (recodified at MD. ST. FIN.
&PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 184) (1987».
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for smaller procurements. In its 1986 session, the General Assembly
passed legislation governing the debarment of contractors who engage in
bribery and other nefarious activites. 183 This legislation provides new
statutory standards for dealing with offending contractors. In addition,
there may be other reformulations in policy if, for example, the General
Assembly were to reconsider the use of state procurement to achieve
socio-economic goals such as encouraging minority business enterprise
participation in public works projects. 184 The elements of Maryland's
modern procurement system provide a convenient framework for examining the potential for future modifications to the system.

A.

How to Award Construction Contracts

Perhaps the state should examine whether contracts for construction of public works should be awarded invariably to the lowest bidder.
Instead, the state could require that construction contracts be awarded
on the basis of demonstrated qualifications at a reasonable price, as are
architectural and engineering contracts. Abolishing the current system
for awarding construction contracts would contravene conventional public policy, which posits that award to the low bidder promotes a sense of
fair treatment by the state; however, abolishing the current system might
lessen the amount of litigation between contractors and the state. By
awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, the contractor and the state
are placed in a potentially adversarial posture. Each party compromises
only as much as is necessary to accomplish what oftentimes appear to be
mutually exclusive goals: the contractor seeks to lower his performance
costs and the state demands maximum performance. 18S
Unfortunately, there are few realistic alternatives to the low bid
method of contract award. In the private sector, where the public treasury is not at risk, construction contracts may be awarded by a number of
informal means. Moreover, in the private sector, competitive negotiation,
such as that used by the state to award architectural and engineering
contracts, is reasonable because it involves a private owner negotiating
among several prospective contractors, each of whom compete for the
contract. Owners in the private sector are free to spend their money in
any manner they choose. Competitive negotiations are an acceptable
method in the private sector because the public is not interested in
whether private owners spend their money wisely.
By contrast, the public expects taxpayers' funds to be spent in an
183. Procurement Law Revision Act, ch. 840, 1986 Md. Laws (repealing current version
and enacting MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. 11-211 (1987» (providing for debarment of contractors for offenses other than bribery) (current version at MD. ST.
FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. § 13-405 (1985»; see also MD. ADMIN. CODE tit.
21.08.04.04 (1985) (setting forth grounds for debarment of businesses).
184. MD. ST. FIN. & PROe. CODE ANN. § 18-601 (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN. &
PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-148) (1987».
185. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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equitable manner. Therefore, contractors should be selected by the state
on the basis of objective, measurable criteria. Because it permits the state
to award contracts in an equitable manner, low bid is the best method for
awarding contracts for the construction of public works.
The modern system of Maryland procurement generally utilizes the
low bid method; however, it contains provisions that grant latitude to
experiment. Although award to the lowest bidder is the preferred method
of awarding state contracts, the executive branch is not barred, as a matter of state law, from experimenting with alternative approaches for
awarding construction contracts. For example, contracts for the design
and construction of a public works project do not always have to be
awarded separately. In the case of certain extraordinary projects, such as
the Hart-Miller Islands Spoil Disposal facility,186 a single contract for
design and construction could be awarded without running afoul of the
Procurement Article.
In the awarding of contracts for construction of ordinary public
works projects (highways, prisons, bridges, or water treatment facilities),
use of the low bid method of award is standard practice. Award to the
lowest responsive and responsible bidder provides contractors and the
public with the impression that state contracts are awarded fairly, because each bidder must compete for the contract on an equal footing.
Hence, award to the low bidder is the order of the day in Maryland, and
will remain so in the foreseeable future.

B.

Contract Terms

With respect to future procurement of construction services for public works projects in Maryland, there should be little change in the foreseeable furture. One major policy issue confronts the state, however. 187
The issue is whether the General Assembly should continue to require
that all of the current clauses be included in contracts for the construction of public works. The General Assembly, in 1981, identified the importance of making sure that all state construction contracts were fairly
uniform. Thus, the Procurement Article mandates that all public works
construction contracts contain certain clauses. 188 Regulations promulgated to implement provisions of the Procurement Article generally establish uniform terms for all such mandatory clauses. The mandatory
186. See Hart & Miller Islands Area Envtl. Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army,
621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980).
187. There are numerous other issues facing the General Assembly with respect to state
procurement. A number of these issues were raised in House Bill 100, which was
subject to hearings in the House Committee on Constitutional and Administrative
Law on January 23, 1985 and the Senate Committee on Economic and Environmental Affairs on June 4, 1985. For a good discussion of the issues, see Garrett, Report
o/the Ad Hoc House Bill 100 Subcommittee a/the Public Contract Law Committee,
MD. BAR Assoc. SEC. STATE & LOCAL GOV'T LAW (Aug. 13, 1985).
188. MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-602(a) (1985) (recodified at MD. ST. FIN.
& PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-122(A) (1987)).
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clauses fairly deal with the allocation of risks inherent in public works
construction and there is no foreseeable reason to revert back to oppressive clauses.
Recently, however, legislation was proposed that would have eliminated a number of the mandatory clauses. For example, in 1985, House
Bill 100 originally proposed to delete the Differing Site Conditions
Clause. 189 Although the Differing Site Conditions Clause was reinserted,
the final version of the bill called for the removal of other clauses. 190
House Bill 100 was not enacted; however, its existence as a proposal
demonstrates that certain misgivings are held about the wisdom of current procurement law. Perhaps the drafters of House Bill 100 believed
that deleting the clauses would clarify procurement law and simplify the
process of procurement in Maryland. 191
There is little justification for deleting any of the mandatory clauses.
By now, most contractors and state officials are familiar with the clauses.
The mandatory clauses are similar to clauses used in the federal sector;
thus, a body of federal law currently exists to guide the interpretation of
the mandatory clauses in Maryland cases. 192 More importantly, the
clauses are practical and fair. Since 1981, nothing has transpired that
would justify their deletion. In current form, the mandatory clauses provide a balanced and reasonable allocation of the risks inherent in public
works construction.

C

Dispute Resolution

MSBCA provides contractors and the state with a neutral forum in
which to settle their contract disputes. So long as the parties to a public
works contract are bound to a fixed contract price-especially one which
is invariably the lowest bid-there will be disputes during the construction of public works. Because disputes are inherent in the public works
construction process, a reasonable procedural means for resolution of
189. § 11-122, H.B. 100, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (First Reader). See also Livingston, The Proposed New DSC Clause-A Mistake, Daily Record, Jan. 15, 1985, at 3,
col. 3.
190. E.g., the Variations in Estimated Quantities Clause. See § 11-122(c), H.B. 100, Md.
Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (Third Reader). For a MSBCA decision construing the
Variations in Estimated Quantities Clause, see Appeal of Martin G. Imbach,
MSBCA No. 1020 (May 31, 1983). .
191. See § ll-102(b)(7), H.B. 100, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. (First Reader). See Procurement, 1985: Hearings on House Bil/100 before Senate Economic & Environmental Affairs Committee, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Interim Sess. (June 4, 1985)
(statement of William S. James, State Treasurer).
192. See Dewey Jordan, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n.,
258 Md. 490, 265 A.2d 892 (1970) (referring to federal case law for guidance in
construing provisions of a contract between a Maryland public corporate body and
a contractor). For a comprehensive treatise on federal procurement law, which illustrates the manner in which state contract clauses are closely modeled on federal
clauses, see II NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 68, at 1104-1356.
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disputes must be available to the parties. MSBCA satisfactorily serves
this purpose.
Unfortunately, there is a move afoot to diminish the power of
MSBCA. In particular, the General Assembly recently has considered
proposals to reduce its jurisdiction. In the 1985 and 1986 sessions, it was
proposed that the jurisdiction over bid protests be shifted from MSBCA
to the Board of Public Works.193
There is no justification for removing bid protest jurisdiction from
MSBCA to the Board of Public Works. 194 MSBCA is nonpolitical, in the
sense that its membership does not receive any financial contributions
from the parties who appear before it. Moreover, unlike decisions emanating from the Board of Public Works, written decisions issued by
MSBCA furnish a body of precedent to guide the resolution of future
cases. 195 MSBCA has issued over sixty-five decisions since 1981, which
are available to inform parties about their rights with respect to various
issues of contract formation. Contractors can examine the MSBCA's decisions to ascertain whether the merits of their protests justify an appeal.
By contrast, the ability of the Board of Public Works to make detailed findings of fact or conclusions of law is limited. The reasoning
which underlies decisions rendered by the Board of Public Works is not
always published. Hence, a body of guiding legal precedent would not be
available to instruct future disputants. If the Board of Public Works were
to have jurisdiction over disputes between contractors and the state, the
contractors might be inclined to view political-rather than legal-factors as influential in the resolution of procurement disputes. Giving the
Board of Public Works jurisdiction over procurement disputes would be
a step backwards in the development of a modern procurement system.
Instead, the jurisdiction of MSBCA over disputes ought to be expanded. Counties and municipalities should use MSBCA to resolve their
disputes with contractors. Indeed, the 1985 session of the General Assembly considered proposed legislation that would make MSBCA available to hear disputes over $10,000 that arise out of construction contracts
with political subdivisions. 196 Passage of such legislation will promote
193. See Policy Amendment No. 35, Hearings on House Bill 100 before House Constitutional and Administrative Law Committee, Md. Gen. Assem., 1984 Sess. (policy
amendment proposed by James Committee). The MSBCA has jurisdiction to hear
appeals pertaining to disputes over contract formation, which are known as "bid
protests," pursuant to MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 17-201(e)(1) (1985)
(recodified at MD. ST. FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-137(E) (1987)).
194. Livingston, State Bid Projects Face Shift in Jurisdiction, Daily Record, Dec. 21,
1983 at 3, col. 1.
195. But see letter from William S. James, State Treasurer to Senators Stone, Cushwa,
and Kramer (Aug. 28, 1985) in which Mr. James argued that "[t]he development of
a body of precedents by the Board of Contract Appeals is of little value to the
average lawyer and of no value to the average citizen. It strengthens the monopoly
of a few specialists, who represent big business." [d. A copy of the letter is on file
with the author.
196. H.B. 1490, Md. Gen. Assem., 1985 Sess. See also Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 539, § 1,
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the submission of lower-priced bids, because contractors will compete
more vigorously for contracts with political subdivisions if, as is the case
with state contracts, they are assured an impartial forum is available for
resolution of disputes.
Moreover, with respect to contracts involving the state agency
known as the Interstate Division for Baltimore City, MSBCA should
have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of contracts for federally
funded highway projects between contractors and Baltimore City.197
Giving MSBCA jurisdiction over such disputes would provide for uniform treatment of all disputes arising out of contracts for the construction of the interstate highway system. The MSBCA provides a practical
and impartial forum for resolution of disputes, which should be available
to disputants on all contracts that involve the expenditure of state funds.
Although increased staffing for MSBCA may be necessary, such administrative expenses would be offset by the benefits of the lower priced bids
that will result from more vigorous competition.
V.

CONCLUSION

The modern era of Maryland procurement began in 1976 when the
General Assembly passed legislation that provided for a partial waiver of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Shortly thereafter, MDOT created a
board of contract appeals, introduced standard clauses for inclusion in
procurement contracts, and instituted responsible procedures for contract award. These three safeguards were designed to enhance MDOT's
ability to insure fair treatment for contractors.
In 1981, with the passage of the Procurement Article by the General
Assembly, the safeguards provided by MDOT became applicable to virtually all state contracts. The policy of fair treatment for contractors doing business with the State of Maryland was incorporated into law. In the
future, the policy of providing fair treatment for contractors who do
business with the state will continue to be a crucial aspect of Maryland
procurement.

1984 Md. Laws 2834 (supplementing Baltimore City Charter, art. II, § 4A (rev.
1964) (providing that Baltimore City may not require disputes of more than $10,000
to be decided by an officer or official body of Baltimore City).
197. See James Julian, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 63 Md. App. 74, 492 A.2d 308
(1985).

